The decision in Broughton v. Marcy Ave. Owners LLC, 238 A.D.3d 536 (1st Dept. 2025) offers a critical reminder to defense counsel that the seemingly ironclad protections of New York Labor Law §240(1) are not insurmountable. While the statute imposes absolute liability in many elevation-related construction accident cases, Broughton demonstrates how detailed factual rebuttals, especially those grounded in sound expert analysis, can raise triable issue of facts sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
The Claim: A Fall Through a Roof
The plaintiff, Tyrell Broughton, worked as a demolition laborer and alleged he fell approximately 20 feet through an unsecured opening on a roof while carrying material during a building demolition project. According to deposition testimony from both Broughton and a co-worker, the hole was covered by a metal sheet that gave way beneath him, causing him to plummet to the floor below.
On the surface, this narrative seems tailored perfectly to §240(1)’s framework. The “Scaffold Law” imposes strict liability on owners and contractors when a worker is injured due to the absence or inadequacy of safety devices required for elevation-related work. Courts have consistently ruled that a fall through an unguarded or improperly secured hole in a roof or floor is a textbook example of a §240(1) violation. [See Guaraca v West 25th St. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 226 AD3d 568, 568 (1st Dept 2024); Cashbamba v 1056 Bedford LLC, 168 AD3d 638, 639 (1st Dept 2019)].
Relying on this precedent, Broughton moved for summary judgment. His motion included both his own testimony and that of his coworker, which, taken at face value, supported the conclusion that safety devices were absent or insufficient and that his fall was the direct result.
The Defense: Medical Records and Biomechanics Tell a Different Story
Rather than default to a liability apportionment or seek settlement, defendants Cascade 553, LLC; Empire ID Construction; and Blur Rock Contracting, Inc. mounted a strategic counteroffensive. Their approach exemplifies how experienced defense counsel can transform a case seemingly destined for a plaintiff ’s victory into one mired in factual dispute.
The defendants submitted expert reports and affidavits from two key professionals: a biomechanical expert and a board-certified neurosurgeon who conducted an independent medical examination (IME) of the plaintiff. Their findings undermined the very foundation of plaintiff ’s version of events. The biomechanical expert determined that a 20-foot fall would, according to the laws of physics and based on existing medical literature, typically result in significant injuries, particularly fractures or observable trauma to weight-bearing joints and the spine. Yet Broughton’s only documented injury on the date of the accident was a minor elbow abrasion.
The neurosurgeon’s IME revealed what the report described as “nonphysiologic findings” and “symptom magnification.” The doctor noted the absence of acute trauma in the plaintiff’s cervical and lumbar spine despite Broughton’s claim that he either landed on his feet or face (the story changed). Both scenarios would cause significant injuries from that height. Both experts concluded that the described fall and resulting injury was medically implausible.
The Result: Summary Judgment Denied
The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s denial of summary judgment for the plaintiff. Although the court acknowledged that plaintiff successfully established a prima facie case under §240(1), it also found that defendants had raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the accident occurred in the manner alleged.
This is a significant result for defense attorneys litigating under New York’s notoriously plaintiff-friendly Labor Law. The ruling reaffirms that when defendants offer credible, fact-based challenges to the plaintiff’s version of events, particularly through expert testimony, a case may be successfully disputed before reaching the liability phase of trial.
Notably, the court drew a clear distinction between the viable expert testimony and other unsubstantiated attacks on the plaintiff ’s credibility. For example, defendants’ reference to Broughton’s criminal history was deemed irrelevant. Similarly, the court rejected the notion that unproven allegations of fraud in unrelated RICO actions could, without more, undermine plaintiff’s claim. These aspects of the opinion serve as a caution to defense counsel: Arguments based on speculation or unrelated past conduct can dilute stronger, science-based challenges.
Key Takeaways Broughton underscores several key defense strategies that can be helpful in §240(1) litigation:
• Utilize experts. The case highlights the value of obtaining early expert review, particularly in high-exposure construction injury cases where plaintiff’s claims appear exaggerated. By challenging the mechanics of the accident and the plausibility of injury, the defense forced the court to confront a narrative that didn’t align with medical reality.
• Avoid overreaching. While the defendants succeeded with their medical evidence, their attempts to discredit the plaintiff based on criminal history and third-party allegations were unsuccessful. Defense counsel must be surgical in argumentation. Courts are more receptive to empirical evidence than to character attacks or innuendo.
• Reframe the narrative. Broughton shows that defendants do not have to accept the factual assumptions underlying the §240(1) claim. A credible challenge to whether the accident occurred at all, or in the way it was described, can shift the case from strict liability territory into a simple factual dispute.
The court’s decision in Broughton will not halt the tide of Labor Law §240(1) claims, but it arms defense counsel with a powerful roadmap. Credibility disputes rooted in science can successfully break through the otherwise strict language of the statute. In an environment where plaintiff victories often seem a forgone conclusion, Broughton offers a rare and timely reminder that the facts still matter.
About the Authors:
Tracy J. Abatemarco, co-managing partner, New York office; and D. Bradford Sessa, senior counsel, are with Wood Smith Henning & Berman. tabatemarco@ wshblaw.com; dbsessa@wshblaw.com