From the perspective of attorneys and claims professionals, the Supreme Court’s 2025-2026 term was the most active and important in recent memory. While the Court did its usual weighing in on esoteric points within obscure laws such as the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA), the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act (SLCRMA), and the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), it spent an inordinate amount of time and pages directly addressing the litigation process. Interestingly, the conservative/liberal schism that has defined the Court is rarely present in cases that impact the practice of law and the craft of claims handling. Instead, the Court’s decisions in this arena appear to break more along the plaintiff/defendant factions, most often in favor of plaintiff.
Who Has Standing to Sue?
We start with decisions examining whose interest is great enough to be permitted to access the courts. In Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections, candidates for elected office challenged the state law permitting mail-in ballots to be counted provided that they were postmarked by Election Day and received within 14 days of the election date. Three candidates argued that allowing the extension thwarted Congress’ intent to have a national election day. The federal district court and the Seventh Circuit held that the petitioners lacked standing because the harm—that the additional ballots could swing the vote—was too speculative, and therefore the plaintiffs lacked a “personal stake” sufficient to gain standing. While the Court could have ruled on the constitutionality of the law itself, the majority in this 7-2 decision limited its review to the issue of standing to challenge the law, finding that candidates have an interest in ensuring that there is a fair election, which was sufficient to grant standing.
At the end of the term, the Court, in a 5-4 decision in Watson v. Republican National Committee, ruled that state statutes that allow counting ballots cast on or before Election Day, but received after Election Day, are constitutionally valid.
In another case involving standing, New Jersey’s attorney general launched a consumer-fraud investigation involving a religious nonprofit pregnancy-resource organization. In furtherance of the investigation, the AG issued subpoenas requiring the nonprofit to provide internal documents and extensive donor information. The subpoenas warned of penalties for noncompliance. The state had not yet taken any enforcement action when the nonprofit filed suit to quash the subpoenas.
The lower court in First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. v. Davenport dismissed the cause of action for lack of standing, as no court had yet compelled compliance and therefore the harm was still only speculative. The unanimous Supreme Court, though, reversed the lower courts, holding that the demand for sensitive donor information presented a First Amendment associational rights injury, giving the recipient of the subpoenas standing to immediately sue in federal court.
From a practice standpoint, these two cases may result in more plaintiffs surviving the threshold question of standing when the harm may appear as speculative. This may result in borderline cases going through fuller discovery and introducing more cost and uncertainty to defendants.
State vs Federal Law
In Doe v. Dynamic Physical Therapy, LLC, the Court was presented with a COVID-period Louisiana state law that immunized health care providers from civil liability during public health emergencies. Plaintiff sued under a federal claim theory. The state trial and appellate courts dismissed the plaintiff’s claims holding that the state statute barred plaintiff’s federal claim. The plaintiff appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court, which, relying on the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, unanimously held that defining the scope of liability under state law is the state’s prerogative, but “[a] State has no power to confer immunity from federal causes of action.” This declaration eliminates state attempts to limit the impact of federal laws from civil rights legislation (§ 1983), to ADA and Title VI / VII.
Another clash between state and federal law played out in Berk v. Choy. Delaware, like many states, set up gatekeeping laws to screen out frivolous malpractice suits. The statute requires a malpractice suit to be accompanied by a doctor’s sworn certification of merit. The law allowed a plaintiff to move for an extension to submit the certification. Berk, a non-citizen of Delaware, was injured while in Delaware. He filed a malpractice suit in Delaware federal district court under diversity jurisdiction. The defendants moved to dismiss, citing Berk’s failure to provide the certificate or seek an extension.
The lower court, applying state law, agreed with the defendants and dismissed the case. The Third Circuit affirmed. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that, although state law imposed the requirement, the Federal Rules controlled the federal case, and Rule 8 required only a “short and plain statement of the claim.” This decision can foreseeably encourage more litigation in federal courts when plaintiffs able to forum shop may thwart stricter state requirements.
Removal to Federal Court
Unless controlled by another federal statute, federal law requires that a motion for removal from state court to federal court occur within 30 days after service of the initial pleadings. There are exceptions when “an amended pleading motion, order or other paper” creates a change in the party’s position. Within this framework, the Court considered what constitutes such a change. In Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist, Palmquist, a Texas citizen, sued Hain Celestial Group and Whole Foods in state court. The claims against Whole Foods included state-law negligence and breach of warrantee.
Hain, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New York, moved for removal, asserting diversity jurisdiction. The problem was that Whole Foods was also a Texas citizen. Diversity jurisdiction exists only when “no adverse party is from the same state.” Hain sought to cure this defect by arguing in its removal motion that Whole Foods had been improperly joined and should be dismissed, thereby creating diversity jurisdiction.
Because removal had to be filed within 30 days of service, Hain had to file both motions together. The district court agreed that Whole Foods had been improperly joined and dismissed them. That dismissal created the desired diversity jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit agreed. SCOTUS, however, did not. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that diversity is considered at the time of the filing of the motion. Here, Whole Foods was still in the case, so diversity did not exist.
The flip side to the Hain coin appeared in Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel. Michigan sought to stop Enbridge’s 645-mile petroleum pipeline by voiding a nearly 70-year-old easement for a four-mile stretch running under the Straits of Mackinac. If successful, Enbridge’s continued operation would be illegal. Over a year into the litigation, the governor revoked the easement and filed a second suit against Enbridge.
Enbridge removed the second case to federal court. The parties agreed to hold the first case in abeyance while the federal case proceeded. After the state lost on a critical procedural motion in the second case, the governor dismissed that suit.
Enbridge then filed a motion for removal of the first suit arguing the dismissal created a changed circumstance allowing removal of the first suit. The motion for removal was filed 887 days after Enbridge was originally served. Enbridge argued that its motion was, nonetheless, timely because it could not have ascertained grounds for removal until the second case was dismissed. The district court agreed and permitted the removal. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the basis for removal existed at the time of the service of the initial pleadings.
The unanimous Supreme Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit. In doing so, the Supreme Court held the law presented a clear and unmovable deadline and did not provide any equitable-relief exceptions. This opinion largely removes defendant’s ability to see how a case is developing before removing it to federal court.
The Supreme Court further disarmed defendants’ strategic use of timing through its opinion in Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited v. Burton, where service of suit was defective. Coney Island Auto Parts decided not to respond to the improper service resulting in default judgment being entered. Over six years later, funds in satisfaction of the judgment were seized from Coney Island. Coney Island moved to vacate the judgment as void. The Court held that, even if judgment is void, under the federal Rules of Court, a party must file a motion to vacate judgment within a reasonable time after learning about it.
Setting Boundaries
Litigants often determine that their chances of winning are better at the appellate stage than at trial. The problem is that these opportunities mean that they must try a case to conclusion and then appeal. This term, the Court put guardrails on this practice. Among those boundaries, the court was most focused on the courts of appeal reviewing the evidence presented at trial.
In Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, a family entered the U.S. without authorization and sought asylum alleging that a return to El Salvador would amount to a death sentence. Their evidence supported the claim. The immigration judge credited the testimony but ruled that the harm did not rise to “persecution” under the law. All subsequent appellate courts agreed, using the deferential “substantive evidence” rule. A unanimous Supreme Court also agreed, holding that appellate courts cannot re-weigh evidence freely but can only reverse if the evidence is so strong that no reasonable factfinder could disagree. The broader implication is that agency decision-makers (here, an immigration judge) are afforded great deference.
This was not the only time this term that the Court weighed in on the issue of judicial restraint by appellate bodies. Occasionally, courts will base their rulings on issues not raised by the parties. In Margolin v. The National Association of Immigration Judges, (NAIJ), the Department of Justice adopted a rule requiring immigration judges to obtain supervisory approval before giving public speeches related to their work. NAIJ sued, asserting violations of free speech and due process. The DOJ asserted that the NAIJ had to go through the Civil Service Reform Act’s administrative scheme before going to the federal court. The district court agreed. The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the case. In doing so, it relied on a unique legal issue that was not raised by either party. In a unanimous ruling, the Supreme Court held that courts must decide cases based on the issues and arguments presented by the parties; not create new theories on their own.
Within the context of criminal law, a jury convicted a defendant of attempted murder, and the appellate courts affirmed the conviction. Post conviction, the defendant raised the issue that the state failed to disclose relevant Brady evidence. In Brady v. Maryland (1963) and its progeny, the Supreme Court has held that prosecutors have the duty to turn over material evidence that may be favorable to the accused. Failure to do so could lead to having a conviction overturned.
Here, in Klein v. Martin, the 8-1 Court concluded that the suppressed information was not material and therefore did not violate Brady. In doing so, the Court stated that the “AEDPA requires federal courts to defer to reasonable state-court decisions.”
In T. M. v. University of Md. Medical System Corporation, the parties negotiated a consent order in a state court proceeding, which T.M. immediately appealed to the state appellate court. Ten days after the trial court entered the order, and while the appeal was pending, T.M. sued in the federal district court seeking to invalidate the consent order. The federal district court dismissed the case, concluding it lacked jurisdiction under the RookerFeldman doctrine. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court.
T.M. appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that Rooker-Feldman applies only to final judgments; since the state trial court’s determination was on appeal, Rooker-Feldman did not apply. In a 5-4 decision that crossed the usual conservative-liberal divide, the Court disagreed, holding that Rooker-Feldman bars federal jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers seeking federal review and rejection of state-court judgments, even when the judgments are not final and subject to state appellate review. This expansion of the RookerFeldman doctrine reduces the ability to use federal courts as a fallback. This is particularly valuable to defendants in § 1983 claims. These four cases emphasize the Court’s desire to achieve finality.
The Court addressed sovereign immunity twice this term, producing mixed results. Sovereign immunity originated in medieval claims that kings could not be sued without consent (rex non potest peccary, “the king can do no wrong”) and was quickly adopted by the states and federal government in America. Each state has established its own distinctive sovereign immunity laws. Galette v New Jersey Transit Corp. presented the Court with a unique set of circumstances and the Court’s decision will have broad impact. New Jersey Transit (NJT) was involved in two separate litigations. In one, an NJT bus struck a pedestrian in New York; in the other, an NJT bus was involved in an accident in Pennsylvania. In both suits, NJT asserted sovereign immunity as an “arm of the State of New Jersey.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that NJT was an arm of the state and immune from suit. New York’s highest court held that NJT was not an arm of the state and could be sued. SCOTUS consolidated the two cases. Ultimately the Court unanimously agreed with the New York court that NJT was not an arm of the state and was not entitled to sovereign immunity. The high court’s decision was based on NJT’s legal structure, which allowed it to sue, be sued, contract and hold property, and on the fact that New Jersey is not responsible for NJT’s debts. This analysis sets the criteria for determining immunity for quasi-public entities such as transit authorities, public utilities, and municipal corporations to assert sovereign immunity.
In a second sovereign immunity case this term, United States Postal Service v. Konan, the Court considered a claim against the USPS based on a letter carrier intentionally withholding Konan’s mail and interfering with its delivery. Interpreting the Federal Tort Claims Immunity Act, the Court was asked whether statutory immunity for claims “arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matters” included intentional withholding of letters or postal matters by a letter carrier. In a 5-4 decision delivered from the bench (as opposed to through the mail), the Court interpreted the terms “loss” and “miscarriage” to include intentional acts by a letter carrier. In doing so, the Court recognized the breadth of the government’s sovereign immunity.
Another form of sovereignty that again engaged the attention of the SCOTUS was Qualified Immunity (QI). While this concept is one found in federal law, many states afford similar protections. Qualified Immunity is a legal doctrine that shields government officials from civil liability unless they violated “clearly established” constitutional rights. To prevail, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the official violated a constitutional right (e.g., unlawful search , excessive force, or wrongful arrest), and that (2) the violated right was clearly established at the time. Generally, this second prong is established by showing that there was a prior case with very similar facts at the time of the official’s actions. Unless the plaintiff can establish these two elements, the official is entitled to QI in the federal system.
In Zorn v. Linton, a group of peaceful protesters legally entered the Vermont state house to stage a sit-in during the governor’s swearing-in. As the capitol closed, police told them to leave or face trespass arrest. Some complied; others, including Linton, did not. An officer approached Linton, repeatedly asked her to stand, and warned that force would be used if she continued to refuse. When she still refused, the officer placed her arm behind her back in a rear wristlock and lifted her to her feet. Linton sued for excessive force under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. The trial court granted summary judgment for the officer under qualified immunity. The Second Circuit affirmed, and Linton appealed to the Supreme Court. In a 6-3 opinion divided along the conservative–liberal philosophical divide, the majority noted that Linton failed to cite any cases with similar facts. This omission led the Court to find that although Linton had a Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, her failure to cite similar cases meant there was no “clearly established” right that had been violated and therefore the officer was intitled to qualified immunity.
Another issue presented to SCOTUS this term that could impact Qualified Immunity was Case v. Montana. This criminal matter involved a warrantless search. Case’s ex-girlfriend called 911 after Case stated to her in a phone call that he was suicidal. The girlfriend’s 911 call reported that after he said that she heard what she thought was a gunshot and then silence from Case’s side of the phone. The officers, knowing Case had mental health issues. showed up and knocked on Case’s door. Receiving no answer, the officers remained outside the home for 40 minutes. Looking in Case’s windows, the officers saw an empty gun holster and a note on the table that could have been a suicide note. The officers entered the home without a warrant. Once inside, Case came out of a closet with what the officers thought was a weapon. An officer shot Case in the leg. The officers later found a gun and charged Case with a crime for having it. Case moved to suppress the evidence in the criminal matter. In a 9-0 decision, the court denied the motion, reasoning that the officers had a good faith belief that Case could be injured or dead. The officers relied on their “objectively reasonable” belief to justify entering the home without a warrant under the emergency-aid exception. Because this case reached the Court as a criminal evidence-suppression question, the civil qualified-immunity issue was not an issue. From a civil-litigation perspective, the case matters because holding that the officers could conduct the warrantless search nullified any opportunity for Case to seek civil damages. Once the Court found that the officers did not violate Case’s constitutional rights, Case’s opportunity to argue the first prong of qualified immunity—that there was an established constitutional right is effectively extinguished.
The Court’s first opinion of the recently ended term involved the “fairness” of the presentation of the trial itself. In Pitts v Mississippi, a father was accused of sexually abusing his daughter. The court granted the state's motion to place a screen between the father and daughter during the daughter’s testimony as permitted by state law. The trial court granted the prosecution’s request to screen the minor without providing specific proofs of the need for the protection. In doing so, the trial court indicated that it viewed the law as requiring the screening as mandatory and therefore no specific proof was required. The defendant appealed his denial to face his accuser to the Mississippi Supreme Court where the state’s highest court rejected the defendant’s argument that the state law permitting the court to screen the daughter from the father violated his 6th Amendment right to confrontation. In reversing the Mississippi high court’s opinion, SCOTUS first recognized that the Mississippi’s state constitution protects the rights guaranteed to victims. It went on to balance the Mississippi law against the federal Sixth Amendment rights. While this decision is clearly a Sixth Amendment matter whose language starts with, “In all criminal prosecutions…” courts and litigants would be well-instructed that the reasoning behind requiring the court to make specific findings to allow shielding could apply to in civil matters such as child abuse in school claims, workplace bullying, and civil RICO claims.
No doubt this year was another continuous term at the Supreme Court. That contentiousness, however, was for the most part absent in cases that impact on how we handle claims and practice law. Of the 15 cases that SCOTUS decided that impacted our professions, two-thirds were decided by unanimous decisions. From a vote count, with a total of 135 votes cast by the Supremes on issues that affect how we do our work, there was 90% agreement between this otherwise philosophically divided group of jurists.
Jeff Marshall is a claims and risk management executive specializing in public entity issues. imanagerisk4u@gmail.com